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One of the most significant challenges for state officials responsible for regulating 
charities in their state is how to approach their duties with regard to the growing trend of hybrid 
enterprises and business forms. More specifically, there are questions about whether these new 
forms are more like charitable trusts and should be treated as such, if they are more like profit-
oriented tax paying enterprises and should be so treated, or if they are something so new and 
different that they require some combination of the two or wholly original approaches. 
Of course, the uncertainty of charity officials and potential inconsistency in their 
approaches create corresponding problems for social enterprises, entrepreneurs who start and 
grow them, investors who support them, and various practitioners who advise them. Investors 
generally like to reduce or at least identify and control for uncertainty in order to maximize their 
financial or other returns. Creditors want to know and understand their lending environment as 
they seek to ensure that the money they lend will be put to productive and fruitful uses and, more 
importantly, that they will be able to get their money back with the predicted and agreed upon 
return so that they can re-circulate those funds and pay their own depositors and investors. 
Entrepreneurs and business managers need access to financial, human, and other capital to start 
and grow their enterprises. Degrees of predictability and consistency facilitate their ability to do 
so, even as entrepreneurs innovate and pursue new opportunities that may inherently disrupt the 
status quo – including by developing new forms and structures for doing so. 
Such doubts and uncertainties are not bad in themselves; they are an important part of 
progress and innovation. New circumstances create new opportunities for any number of 
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advances, mischief, or abuse. It is the response to those circumstances that will dictate whether 
society is allowed to advance while managing potential downside or if the threats are deemed so 
great that regulation must effectively obscure and prevent opportunities for advancement. 
Thus, the key question is not whether hybrid forms whose purposes and activities include 
pursuing charitable outcomes should be regulated but rather how they should be regulated, 
particularly in the absence of direct guidance from the legislature. One approach would treat all 
charitable hybrid forms as charitable trusts, corporations, or associations. An alternative would 
regulate these entities as other for-profit, tax-paying organizations even though there may be 
differences in fiduciary duties and ultimate objectives. A critical related question is whether 
lawmakers should proactively bring charitable hybrid forms under the realm of charitable trust 
law by statute if such regimen would not otherwise apply. 
Among hybrid forms, the questions most clearly apply to the low profit limited liability 
company, whose primary objectives must be to further charitable purposes. However, the question 
affects the flexible purpose and benefit corporation forms because, at a minimum, charitable 
purposes are a subset of the social good that these latter forms more broadly identify as 
permissible. 
At a different level, the questions also affect the general public more broadly as it seeks to 
understand these forms and whether or how they might adopt them, including efforts to define 
what constitutes “charitable purposes” and what deserves special tax treatment. An essential 
concern for the general public is ensuring accurate understandings of how contributions to these 
various forms differ from contributions to charitable enterprises exempt from taxation under 
501(c)(3). Nomenclature will not be enough, and there must be ways to hold fundraisers and 
operators of hybrid forms accountable for contributing to and/or abusing confusion that might 
exist. 
Although understandable to want to regulate these forms as if charitable trusts or 
otherwise subjected to charitable oversight, it is not the only alternative and may not be the best 
for society. Other tools are available to protect the public and hold managers, officers, directors, 
and members/owners accountable. In addition, many of the reasons to impose charitable oversight 
on exempt organizations do not apply to these hybrid forms. Such oversight is not consistent with 
historical approaches to charitable activities pursued by non-hybrid, non-exempt forms. A 
charitable regulatory overlay could inhibit or even prevent charitable hybrids from achieving their 
charitable objectives, which ultimately should positively serve society and, as such, are desirable 
outcomes. Finally, legislatures in many states have declared a public policy that favors creation 
and adoption of these forms, and it is constitutionally incumbent on the executive branch to 
facilitate rather than impede that declaration, even arguably in those states that have not formally 
adopted the specific hybrid forms. 
For these same reasons, legislatures also do not need to and should not surrender to the 
impulse to enact laws that affirmatively bring charitable hybrid forms under the rubric of 
charitable trust or charities law more generally. 
 
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
An essential first step in addressing concerns of regulators is to arrive at a reasoned 
understanding of what needs to be regulated. Without that understanding, there are very real 
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dangers of over or under regulating and attendant consequences. This section presents the core 
relevant characteristics of the new forms and addresses common misperceptions about the L3C, 
which is most likely to be caught in the charitable trust web. In this way, discussions about 
proper regulation of the charitable hybrid forms can focus on what is appropriate for each form 
generally rather than burdening every application of the forms with a broad regulatory regime 
that assumes only the worst and neglects their potential usefulness. 
Throughout, this discussion demonstrates that none of these forms satisfy the conditions 
for imposing charitable trust law by virtue of their generic structure as distinguished from 
specific applications of any given form. Rob Wexler’s paper that is part of these proceedings and 
my recent article in the NYU Journal of Law and Business more deeply analyze those conditions, 
which in essence require an intent that assets be dedicated exclusively to charitable purposes – an 
intent that cannot be unilaterally inferred by virtue of these statutory forms, including the L3C.  
A. Key Elements of the Primary New Forms 
The most commonly discussed of the new hybrid forms are the benefit corporation,
1
 
flexible purpose corporation, and low-profit limited liability company (“L3C”). They are 
“hybrids” because they combine core elements of the for-profit and exempt, charitable realms 
that make these new forms both similar to but distinct from traditional forms. 
All three forms share several characteristics that distinguish them from entities that the 
Internal Revenue Service recognizes as exempt charities: (1) hybrids can accumulate and 
distribute net profits and realize appreciated value; (2) contributions to or investments in hybrids 
are not treated as charitable deductions from income and estate; and (3) hybrids presumably are 
responsible for paying income, sales, property, and other taxes (as is discussed later, there are 
some who believe that charitable hybrids should be tax exempt by virtue of their form). 
These forms are distinguishable from the for-profit sector in that each allows, or in the 
case of the L3C requires, subjugation of profits to prioritization of charitable purposes or other 
potentially conflicting demands. How each goes about this activity is one area in which there are 
material differences between the forms and among the reasons to consider regulating them as 
charitable trusts. 
Benefit corporations are a subset of the corporate structure. As a threshold matter, they 
must pursue “general public benefit,” which the statutes define as “a material positive impact on 
society and the environment taken as a whole.”2 As a corollary, the statutes also require directors 
to consider the impact of their decisions on shareholders; employees of the entity, its subsidiaries, 
and suppliers; customers; community and society; local and global environment; short and long 
term purposes; and its ability to accomplish its general and specific public benefits.
3
 There is 
nothing inherently charitable under the Code about these general public benefits or the 
amalgamation of various constituents. 
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In addition, benefit corporations may, but are not required to, designate “specific public 
benefits” among their corporate purposes. These specific benefits may include purposes 
recognized as “charitable” under the Code but the litany of what qualifies is broader and not 
constrained by traditional notions of “charitability” under the law.4 
Consequently, benefit corporations must pursue general benefit purposes that do not 
satisfy legal definitions of “charitability,” and they may add more specific public benefits that 
may be but are not required to be charitable under the law. As such, no benefit corporation can 
pursue exclusively charitable purposes, and no one who contributes to a benefit corporation 
should be presumed to intend the pursuit of such purposes absent an explicit statement of such 
intent that is independent of the underlying form . In this way, benefit corporations are much less 
like exempt charities than profit-oriented enterprises that prioritize profits but may agree with an 
investor to use their resources for charitable activities. 
The flexible purpose corporation requires that incorporators identify “special purpose(s)” 
that the directors may consider in their decision-making in addition to or even at the expense of 
the interests of owners.
5
 These “special purposes” may qualify as charitable under the Code or 
state law, but they are not so limited because they more broadly include promoting or minimizing 




Thus, the flexible purpose corporation’s purposes may, but are not required to, be those 
that the law recognizes as charitable. Although charitable purposes may even be the exclusive 
mandate of the enterprise if the incorporators or subsequent shareholders and directors so elect, 
there is nothing innate about the form that would declare charitable purposes as the sole or 
exclusive province of entities that organize under it. As with the benefit corporation and absent 
discrete adoption of exclusively charitable special purposes, there is nothing about the flexible 
purpose form that implies intent by an investor to dedicate assets exclusively to charitable 
purposes. Like the benefit corporation and for-profit forms generally, an independent, affirmative 
declaration of such an intent should be required, and its absence should suggest the lack of such 
an intent. 
Unlike both corporate hybrid forms, the L3C statutes impose a preference in decision 
making for significantly furthering charitable purposes as defined by the Code, including that the 
entity would not have been formed “but for” its relationship to those charitable purposes.7 The 
statutes further order business priorities by mandating that “no significant purpose” of entities 
organized as L3Cs can be the production of income or appreciation of property value.
8
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Also unique among hybrid forms is that the L3C is a subset of the limited liability 
company regime and as such generally benefits from its flexibility and is hampered by its 
limitations. Among the restrictions on the L3C’s flexibility that materially differentiate it from 
LLCs more generally are the parameters that the statutes place on the ability to modify or define 




Although the L3C must prioritize significantly furthering charitable purposes, it cannot 
and should not be presumed that such purposes are exclusive. Indeed, unless the originators or 
subsequent owners affirmatively and explicitly agree to forgo distribution of income or realization 
of appreciated property value, the L3C form explicitly recognizes the legitimacy – but properly 
placed priority – of these purposes. In addition, the L3C can elect to pursue other purposes – 
including those that are among the general public benefits, special public benefits, and special 
purposes of the benefit and flexible purpose corporate forms – as long as the do not supplant the 
statutorily ordered placement of charitable purposes. 
Thus and like its hybrid cousins in the corporate form, there is nothing about the L3C as a 
structure that renders its purposes exclusively charitable under the law, and investors should not 
be said to have manifest an intent to conscript assets solely for such purposes unless there is 
independent, affirmative evidence of such intent separate and apart from the nature of the L3C 
form itself. 
Both the flexible purpose corporation and L3C could have applications of their forms that 
are dedicated exclusively to charitable purposes as defined by law, and it would be appropriate in 
those instances to imply a manifestation of intent to impose charitable trust duties on investments 
in them under those discrete circumstances. It is conceivable that entities that deploy such 
applications of the forms might even pursue and receive recognition from the IRS and state 
authorities as exempt from taxation and able to permit donors to deduct contributions as 
charitable.
10
 Mere possibilities for such uses, however, do not warrant treating all applications of 
the forms as if exempt, charitable entities entitled to the benefits and subject to the limitations; 
instead, determinations should be unique. 
Consequently, absent a specific declaration in a state’s enabling law, none of these hybrid 
forms should be treated as charitable trusts simply because of their form under state law. They do 
not innately suggest exclusivity of charitable purposes and cannot support an implied 
manifestation of intent to dedicate assets solely to such purposes.  
The Illinois legislature has made such a declaration. At the behest of the then State 
Attorney General, Illinois has explicitly made all L3Cs that operate in the State subject to its 
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virtue of their statutory form. 
9
 See Tyler, 2010, Negating; Tyler, 2013, NYUJL&B. 
10
 In the current environment, an L3C could be recognized as exempt only if it has only one member and that member 
is itself tax exempt. 
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charitable trust regimen and its requirements and restrictions.
11
 The duties are extensive and 
comprehensive; they are not limited to registering as fundraisers and otherwise complying with 
charitable fundraising obligations. The consequences, which are discussed in a later section, are 
significant and negate the ability of L3Cs to operate legitimately in the State other than as 
equivalent to exempt, charitable trusts. It has been suggested that the Attorney General’s intent 
was less restrictive in only wanting L3Cs to comply with charitable fundraising statutes, but that 
is certainly not the law of the State and absent modification by the legislature cannot be safely 
presumed. 
Of course, one of the ways to clarify a state attorney general’s regulatory authority and 
responsibility is by legislative pronouncement, such as that in Illinois. However, there is a 
question about whether the approach in Illinois was appropriate given the inability to presume 
exclusively charitable intent; it is also questionable whether the approach was necessary given 
other alternatives for oversight. Although not going as far as Illinois, the California legislature 
made clear that nothing about its adoption of the flexible purpose corporate form interferes with 
charitable trust requirements and enforcement that is otherwise applicable.
12
 The California 
approach seemed less of a reaction to misperceptions or unique applications of the form than was 
that of Illinois such that it is reasonable to wonder if Illinois would have acted as it did if more 
accurate information was available to it. 
B. Common Misperceptions of the L3C 
The L3C was originally inspired by a desire to make it easier for private foundations to 
make program related investments (“PRIs”) and to increase attention to PRIs as a legitimate tool 
for private foundations to achieve programmatic objectives. But the L3C has a depth that 
transcends private foundations or PRIs. The L3C is the only entity form that, by virtue of its 
elemental structure, inverts priorities inherent in our traditional forms by requiring primary focus 
on charitable purposes (like an exempt charity but unlike a for-profit entity) but permitting 
distribution of profits and realized appreciation of value (like a for-profit but unlike an exempt 
charity). Unfortunately, so much attention has been devoted to the surface applications of the L3C 
that the merits of its deeper innovation has been threatened by regulatory approaches that presume 
private foundation involvement, which has proven to be a misnomer. 
The L3C does not require the involvement of private foundations, as is demonstrated by 
the fact that very few, if any, of the L3Cs formed so far have PRI or private foundation money 
attached to them yet. Instead, investors, entrepreneurs, and managers are seeing different merit in 
organizing as L3Cs – often branding benefits. But as Michael Moreland a founder and principle in 
SEEDR L3C has said, there is value in operating in a form that dictates desired priorities for 
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decision-making when competing interests collide, which they inevitably do.
13
 
Because most of the criticisms of and concerns about the L3C are based on its grounding 
in the PRI regimen, they in many ways are setting up a straw man or red herring for unduly 
attacking the form and, thus, addressing how it should be regulated. Moreover, many of the 
critiques of the PRI-oriented L3C are actually criticisms of PRIs rather than the new form, even 
though PRIs have been permitted since 1969, and they have been deployed successfully in 
numerous circumstances to achieve charitable objectives without evidence of material abuse or 
misuse, including PRIs that have been part of tranched investments.
14
 As such, many criticisms 
are misdirected. 
That being said, the criticisms are important in having encouraged greater awareness of 
the potential for abuse and misuse whether intentionally or by accident. PRIs and L3Cs must be 
structured and documented appropriately in order to ensure priority of charitable purposes and 
protect against impermissible private benefit, among other things. A clear benefit has been to 
bring awareness to the fact that an L3C does not and cannot automatically qualify an entity as a 
legitimate repository for PRIs; private foundations must still satisfy the statutory requirements for 
making PRIs.
15
 Noticeably missing from those requirements is any obligation to get prior 
permission from the IRS for making the PRI. As such, it is also a misperception to assert that 
recognition of the L3C by the IRS is a prerequisite for validity or usefulness for PRIs or other 
foundation funds. 
Another frequent misstatement about L3Cs is that they must provide “public” benefits or 
serve “social” good as distinguished from “significantly furthering charitable purposes” as 
defined by the Internal Revenue Code. Certainly, the latter is a subset of the former but they are 
not synonymous. As currently constructed, it is not appropriate to set up or operate an L3C 
without its focus being on significantly furthering charitable purposes as defined by law. Failure 
to be so constrained, whether intentionally or unintentionally, can lead to problems. Some of this 
confusion may arise because the other hybrid forms do permit consideration of broader 
public/social purposes rather than focusing solely on narrower charitable purposes. 
Of course, this has potential to create its own problems for regulators because the general 
public does not normally make this distinction; even those in the charitable sector itself talk in 
ways that might lead listeners to be confused. After all, charitable purposes do provide public 
benefits and social good, so it is certainly not incorrect to use those terms.
16
 Consequently, 
owners and managers of non-charitable hybrid entities should be more intentional and careful in 
their fundraising and operations or they risk being identified by the public and/or regulators as 
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dedicated to charitable pursuits and possibly subject to regulation accordingly or to consequences 
discussed below for their lack of discipline. 
 
II. GETTING IT WRONG: WHAT IF CHARITABLE HYBRIDS ARE TREATED AS 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS.  
The law of charities has developed over more than 400 years. It has been influenced by 
numerous factors: 
 decisions of kings and presidents, parliaments and legislatures, and courts;  
 policies of communities, states, and nations; and  
 evolution of how formal charity is understood and organized, whether as trusts, 
unincorporated associations, corporations, or limited liability companies.  
A consistent, guiding theme seems to have been ensuring that charitable purposes are 
preserved and prioritized and that those who donate to such entities can be assured that their 
contributions of assets and time are furthering those purposes. At a more practical level, there also 
was recognition that the system lacked an inherent mechanism for overseeing charitable 
enterprises such as there is with profit-oriented businesses whose owners have vested interests in 
paying attention to activities or as with non-charitable trusts who have beneficiaries with 
incentives to ensure compliance. 
Two primary arrangements emerged. First, most states have vested regulatory authority 
and judicial standing in state attorneys general or another chief charity official. Degrees of this 
authority and jurisdiction are supplemented at the federal level by oversight from the Internal 
Revenue Service by virtue of tax treatment. Second, very strict, more detailed mechanisms and 
procedures evolved that restrict the freedom of trustees, directors, and managers to make certain 
decisions or undertake certain actions. Among these are the following: 
 inability to distribute profits or permit private realization of appreciated value; 
 limitations on the ability to compensate those who work for these enterprises, 
including use of equity and certain other forms of incentive compensation strategies; 
 prohibitions on transactions in which an insider might actually receive a benefit or be 
perceived as having done so; 
 restrictions on deviating from specified charitable purposes even to pursue other 
recognized charitable purposes; and 
 constraints on merging, transferring assets, or terminating/dissolving. 
Many of these apply to recognized charities whether corporations, associations, or 
otherwise. One exception is for insider transactions for which the trust regime has retained 
absolute, unforgiving prohibitions, even if the benefit is minimal or accidental. Charities 
structured as corporations, however, have gravitated toward the business model by which such 
transactions can be legally managed by ensuring that decisions are made by uninvolved persons 
with full information and provided that the transaction is ultimately not unfair to the charity. Of 
course, ensuring that such a transaction is managed legally may or may not address perceptions 
that could undermine an entity’s credibility and reputation. 
Under this standard, then, a director of a corporate charity could lease office space to the 
charity for $1 per year but the trustee of a charitable trust could not. In fact, the trustee may not be 
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able to donate the space to the trust if benefits, financial or otherwise, might devolve to the 
trustee. 
This, then, is the crux of the problem for charitable hybrid forms: should they be regulated 
as charities? Whether regulated under either corporate or trust doctrines, then enterprises that 
adopt charitable hybrid forms will be subject to the above restrictions to some debilitating degree. 
Most importantly, if they are charitable trusts or corporations, they cannot distribute profits or 
permit private realization of appreciated value. Essentially, they cannot be hybrids at all. After all, 
investors (even if private foundations or other charities) will not be inclined to invest in 
organizations that cannot return their equity or permit appreciation, especially when there is no 
tax benefit available for doing so. 
This is a problem regardless of the form adopted, whether corporate or limited liability 
company. At least under the corporate form, the fiduciary duties are more permissive with regard 
to insider transactions. L3Cs, however, are more likely to be treated as more constrained 
charitable trusts. 
Other problems also follow, including with regard to compensation and ease of changing 




The problems are not limited to the new hybrid forms either. Consistency and 
predictability will require that contractual adaptations of traditional forms be similarly regulated. 
For instance, if the L3C must be treated as a charitable trust as a matter of form, then it seems that 
every limited liability company that chooses to prioritize furthering charitable purposes must be 
treated similarly. The logic also then applies to whole-entity joint ventures between an exempt 
charity and a for-profit entity (which the IRS suggests must prioritize the charity’s purposes18), 
which would restrict distribution of profits and ability to merge or transfer assets. Should ancillary 
joint ventures involving less than all of the charity’s assets be similarly restricted? 
Arguments for applying charitable trust law to the L3C and other charitable hybrid forms 
should similarly subject any and every entity that receives a program related investment or 
expenditure responsibility grant from a private foundation to limitations on its use of the fruits of 
those assets. Conceivably, the rationale could prevent any recipient of such funds from retaining 
any profits from such PRI funds for the benefit of owners or making other decisions about the 
entity. They also might be prohibited from allowing the results obtained from deployment of 
those funds to contribute to increased value of the overall enterprise. Such applications and 
restrictions would be contrary to how PRIs have functioned over the decades consistent with the 
law. 
What about a taxpaying entity like Newman’s Own, whose owners have agreed to 
dedicate all net profits to charity? Or Google, whose founders and key decision-making owners 
have documented and publicized commitment of 1% of its asset value and profits to charity? 
Although their operations are not charitable and they could not be recognized as tax exempt, their 
purposes certainly further charitable purposes. Should the owners of Newman’s Own and Google 
be permitted to change their mind on their own about how they distribute their respective profits 
                                                          
17
 See Tyler, 2013, NYUJL&B. 
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 See, e.g., St. David’s Health Care System v. United States, 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003); Rev. Ruling 2004-51 
(May 7, 2004).  
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or must they first apply to the state attorney general and/or the courts for permission? Can they 
decide to merge or transfer assets without such permissions? If consistent with some of the 
arguments for applying charitable regulatory approaches to hybrid forms, then such changes must 
require consent of the State. 
Should enterprises like the Omidyar Network and the Gary Community Investment Co. be 
regulated as charities with their combinations of exempt charity and taxpaying forms oriented 
toward accomplishing charitable objectives? If their taxpaying entities are not soliciting funds 
from the public, should principles of regulating charities prevent the subsequent transfer of 
underlying portfolio assets without approval of the attorney general or court? Even if their 
taxpaying entities solicit investment from members of the general public, are they required to 
comply with laws and regulations that apply to both securities registration and charitable 
solicitation? 
Perhaps the above circumstances might be distinguished with an appeal to the distinction 
between corporate and limited liability company forms. Such a distinction, however, neglects the 
underlying principles that apply in the charitable context and overstates the differences between 
the forms as to matters of fiduciary duty. 
Extending charitable trust law to adaptations of traditional forms could have extraordinary 
and unnecessary ramifications, many of which would inhibit public benefit, social good, and 
charitable outcomes. Doing so could intrude inappropriately on fundamentally private decision-
making in contexts that are also either private or market-based. Such results seem extreme and 
undesirable. 
Charitable hybrid forms – as a matter of their macro structure as distinct from unique 
micro applications – seem to have much more in common with adaptations of traditionally 
taxpaying forms than they do with conventional exempt charities. These similarities should 
support the availability of causes of action, remedies, and oversight regimes as alternatives to 
trust law that nonetheless can address the legitimate concerns of charity regulators. Even more so, 
at least for the L3C, there are at least arguments that additional, more compelling causes of action 
and remedies might exist for enforcement than relying on those available under contract or 
traditional limited liability company. 
 
III. OTHER TOOLS ARE AVAILABLE TO ADDRESS LEGITIMATE 
CONCERNS OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND POLICY MAKERS  
Specific applications of charitable hybrid forms might qualify as charitable trusts or 
charities, and they should be so treated when they do. Benefit and flexible corporations are least 
likely to be conscripted as charitable trusts or charities as a matter of their statutory forms. The 
L3C form is more likely to appear to meet the elements for being considered a charitable trust, 
although there are compelling arguments against doing so given the lack of exclusively 
charitable intent. Among other considerations is that alternative means of regulation and 
enforcement are available to address the legitimate concerns of attorneys general, policy makers, 
and others.  
A. State Interests are Best Served by Business-Like Oversight  
States, communities, donors, charities, beneficiaries, and even the entire charitable sector 
itself depend most broadly on states’ attorneys general or other chief charity official to enforce 
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applicable laws, regulations and standards regarding charitable enterprises and assets. They are 
the first line for regulatory oversight of charitable hybrid forms as well. 
At the federal level, the exempt organizations division (“EO”) of the IRS is most 
concerned about organizations that have its imprimatur to justify tax exemptions and charitable 
deductions. The EO division wants to ensure that those entities further recognized charitable 
purposes, do not permit unauthorized private benefit, do not intervene in political campaigns or 
pursue impermissible lobbying, and make certain documents publicly available. As a purely legal 
matter, then, the EO division is most interested in individual organizations within its orbit at the 
micro level. However, the IRS also has important responsibilities and influence on the health and 
integrity of the charitable sector at the macro level as well, but the ability of the EO division to 




For instance, the EO division could pursue an exempt organization that misused charitable 
donations but it is not the first line of defense to directly pursue a non-exempt entity that 
misrepresented its fundraising as if for charitable activities, much less protect a confused donor 
even in the absence of misrepresentations. The states attorneys general could pursue both and thus 
protect micro interests of donor intent and macro interests in charitability and the credibility of the 
charitable sector as a whole. 
Consequently, regulatory interests in and oversight uncertainty about charitable hybrid 
forms understandably are most pronounced at the state level. As such, states attorneys general 
worry about tax treatment, charitable activities, and protecting against impermissible private 
benefit. They also worry most directly about fiduciary duty, charitable fundraising, and the “halo” 
affect and goodwill that attach to the sector and its members. These are the purview of the states 
much more directly than the IRS or the federal government, which means that these legitimate 
interests with regard to charitable hybrids must be resolved by the states. 
States are a significant repository for enforcement of fiduciary, governance, and other 
aspects of business, particularly those numerous areas that have not been preempted by the federal 
government. These tools for regulating business are and should be available for overseeing 
activities of charitable hybrids and enforcing their requirements.  
These tools at the state level offer at least two advantages to the mechanisms available 
under charitable trust and charity law. First, they most effectively balance legislative and policy 
objectives for formalizing charitable hybrid forms with ensuring against fundraising abuse and 
preserving the integrity of the charitable sector. Second, they provide greater consistency with 
historic practices with regard to contractual adaptations of traditional structures. 
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 It has been suggested that viability of the L3C depends on the IRS issuing a ruling or other advice that specifically 
acknowledges the L3C and the legitimacy of it as a vehicle for receiving program related investments. However, no 
such ruling or guidance is needed or, for that matter, likely. It is not needed for at least two reasons: (1) PRIs do not 
require pre-approval from the IRS; and (2) most L3Cs do not have any ties to private foundations much less to PRIs.It 
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because of the customized fit with the specific foundation’s charitable purposes, in which case blanket rulings are not 




In other words, treating charitable hybrid forms generally as if charities or charitable trusts 
fundamentally interferes with or even destroys the ability of enterprises operating under such 
forms to function as intended, including restrictions on distributing profits, realizing appreciated 
property value, using equity in incentive compensation, or making decisions about mergers, 
transfers, or terminations. Treating them as businesses does not undermine that legislative/policy 
intent. It also does not require completely rewriting or redesigning how to regulate enterprises that 
receive program related investments, joint ventures among for profit and exempt charitable 
entities, taxable entities that pursue charitable purposes, or organizations like Newman’s Own, 
Google, Omidyar, and many others. 
Finally, business tools for regulation and enforcement also aid attorneys general in 
protecting against fundraising fraud and in preserving the integrity of the charitable sector 
and the “halo” effect that is available to those who operate honorably within it. These tools 
expand available causes of action, corresponding remedies, and standing to enforce the 
requisite elements and priorities of the forms, such as they are.  
B. Alternative Standards, Causes of Action and Remedies, and Expanded Standing  
1.  Standards, Causes of Action, and Remedies  
Most hybrid adaptations of traditional forms and the PRI rely on contract principles to 
determine and enforce various rights and responsibilities for pursuing charitable purposes. 
Such dependence on contract can offer flexibility for customization (particularly in the 
limited liability context). Thus, agreements can be freely modified and/or purposes waived 
with impunity, which also is the case with the corporate hybrid forms if enough shareholders 
agree. People can, do and will change their minds about charitability, public benefits, and 
social good, and control of decision-making can, does, and will devolve to others whose 
priorities differ. Principles of contract will apply as will their limited remedies for breach.  
Done right and done well, charitable hybrids will have fiduciary principles, causes of 
action, and remedies to supplement those of contract and thus better preserve charitable 
purposes, public benefits, and social good.
20
 Statutory and common law fiduciary duties that 
attach by virtue of a form’s genetic disposition are much more likely to provide clarity, 
certainty, and consistency when those qualities are desired.
21
 More than any other charitable 
hybrid form, the L3C statutes inject clear priorities and duties into the form. In this way, they 
may resemble trusts but without their uncompromising elements. Of course, these qualities 
only attach to the L3C to the extent that conversion to LLC status as allowed by statute 
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 For a discussion about why the limited liability company form fails to provide these qualities, see Tyler, 
2010, Negating.  
22 The possibility of converting L3C status is necessary and also is consistent with its PRI precursor. The 
Internal Revenue Code and accompanying regulations permit a private foundation to convert a PRI into an 
alternative status.. However, the L3C conversion should occur in a context of the fiduciary priorities 
established by the statutes. Consequently, conversion should only be permitted if a fiduciary decision is 
made that either the charitable purposes have in fact been significantly furthered or achieved or that doing so 
through the L3C structure is no longer likely (or possible). Such decisions should be informed, debated, and 
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Fiduciary duties permit additional causes of action and remedies, including punitive 
damages, disgorgement of profits, removal, and others. Contractual remedies are limited to 
damages actually caused or as appropriate to put the parties in a position they would have 
been in had the obligations been performed; however, punitive damages, lost profits, and 
attorneys’ fees are not normally recoverable. A problem with charitable hybrids is that there 
may not be damages in a monetary sense because neglecting the charitable priority may 
actually increase profitability, in which case contract remedies are inadequate. Fiduciary 
remedies, on the other hand, can be useful and appropriate, which is part of the reason that 
fiduciary responsibilities must attach to the forms for them to be most worthwhile. 
Other civil and criminal causes of action and remedies also become more likely 
resources, including those based on fraud and misrepresentation, consumer protection, and 
conspiracy to defraud. State and federal securities laws can also be invoked for civil and 
criminal relief. Depending on the nature of the underlying scheme, it may even be possible to 
prosecute for violations of the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act, which 
permits treble damages and pre-trial forfeiture. Administratively at the federal level, the 
Federal Trade Commission may take more of an interest in these new hybrid forms than they 
have traditionally taken in exempt charities and the deference due to IRS.
23
 
Finally with regard to causes of action and remedies, it may be appropriate to 
resurrect the ultra vires doctrine and permit piercing of the veil of personal liability that 
otherwise covers the corporate and LLC forms, particularly if the circumstances support 
finding an intent to deceive using the hybrid forms. These may be particularly useful tools for 
attorneys general to enforce the sanctity of form. 
2.  Standing 
With regard to standing, recall that the attorney general is the primary enforcer of 
charitable trust law with assistance from the EO division of the IRS for exempt charities. A 
donor may have limited standing in certain instances; beneficiaries almost never have 
standing. Unlike charitable trusts and charities, charitable hybrid forms actually do have 
owners who have interests to oversee and motivation to protect them and keep watch over the 
managers and operators of the business. Presumably, those owners or some material segment 
of them are (or at least one time were) motivated by the primacy of charitable purposes; they 
have the power to preserve and enforce that primacy.  
Enforcement problems arise if the owners change their mind, if they change, or if 
they never had or acquired that motivation. But in a fiduciary situation, all of the owners may 
need to change their minds not just a majority or even super-majority of them, which then 
empowers only one owner— even of a very small interest—who remains dedicated to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
documented. There is much more work, study, and thinking to be done on the practical means for L3C 
conversions. 
Conflicts of interest are inherent in such decisions because owners will likely make money from successful 
outcomes, in which case their motives may be impugned. Those conflicts will be impossible to avoid but may 
justify requiring notice of the conversion to the state attorney general, or at least secretary of state, and to 
potentially affected parties (e.g. owners/members, directors, managers, employees, customers, creditors) and 
the public. Of course, the entity could no longer use the “L3C” designation, which is its own type of notice. See 
Tyler, 2010, Negating. 
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organization’s charitable purposes. Not only that, but it may be that the “conspiracy of the 
whole” would also need to entice officers and managers who themselves may have separate 
authority and responsibility to preserve primacy of charitable purposes. 
In the for -profit, business context, it is not a sufficient defense to having violated the 
law for corporate directors, officers and managers to assert that they were only doing what 
the owners wanted them to do, even if that desire was unanimous. There is an independent 
responsibility that attaches so that the governance and day-to-day management personnel 
must either resign or refuse when confronted with a dictate to violate the law.  
Managers of limited liability companies similarly lack permission to violate the law 
because it happens to be what the owners/members want. As flexible as most LLC statutes 
and uniform laws are with regard to deferring to the members’ ability to define the terms of 
their engagement, including with regard to fiduciary duties, even they do not permit waivers 




Similarly, the core elements of the L3C, as statutory declarations of public policy, 
should not be permitted to be waived or released without an express statement from the 
legislature to that effect. The absence of such a statement suggests a standard other than 
deference to the capricious will of members. If the members cannot or will not abide by that 
standard, then it seems as if the choices for the managers of the L3C are the same as those 
presented to directors, officers, and managers of corporate entities in similar circumstances – 
resign or refuse, including possibly seeking third party intervention. 
In many ways, the responsibilities of directors, officers, and managers of charitable 
hybrid forms may be similar in this regard to those of exempt charities. Although there are no 
owners of such enterprises, any given director, officer, or manager may have standing to 
enforce the exclusive charitable purposes of the enterprise against their colleagues who 
would compromise or neglect those purposes. 
Additionally, there may be third parties who have standing to pursue certain types of 
claims and remedies based on misrepresentations made to them in order to entice them to 
provide more favorable terms or conditions for engagement. Among these may be creditors, 
suppliers, or local taxing jurisdictions that reasonably rely to their detriment on a charitable 
hybrid having declared primacy of charitable purpose. Although these claims may not rise to 
the level of fraud – either civil or criminal – equitable actions and remedies may be very 
effective in holding an enterprise and its personnel accountable.
25
  
C. Consistency with the Market 
Inextricably bounded to discussion of charitable hybrid forms must be how they 
should function in our nation’s economic system, including tax treatment, and as a result 
what effect they should have on that system. There is little doubt that these forms are (and 
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no such letter for the charitable hybrid, which necessarily means greater reliance by third parties on 
representations by principals or their agents. 
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should be) disruptive, but questions remain about the nature and extent of their disruption. 
Should they be allowed to operate outside of the marketplace like exempt charities or should 
they be subject to the disciplines and competition of the market? How this question is 
answered will fundamentally drive the effect that charitable hybrid forms have on our 
markets, including the potential to stifle innovation and mid- and long-term individual and 
communal development. 
How attorneys general approach these questions also will influence how they 
approach their regulatory and enforcement duties and responsibilities. There are compelling 
reasons to ensure that charitable hybrids disrupt the marketplace from within. Any other 
approach risks destruction rather than disruption, whether of the market or even the 
charitable, philanthropic sector. 
Owners of these charitable hybrid forms are entitled to distribution of net profits, if 
any, and to realize the appreciated value of the business, if any. They also can take business 
losses as deductions, just as any other for-profit business investor. In other words, they are 
engaging the market and its risk/reward mechanisms. Those risks may be higher than normal 
and the rewards may not be as high as normal given charitable focus, but opportunities for 
financial gain may exist. In addition, although market level returns may be less likely, they 
are not prohibited and may be realized or even exceeded in certain instances. Moreover, the 
forms allow for investors that are motivated more by potential for financial gain than by 
pursuit of charitable outcomes. Thus, these forms should not be excused from the market.  
Excusing charitable hybrids from the market could undermine competition with 
profit-oriented enterprises. After all, the corporate hybrid forms in particular will most likely 
operate in what is otherwise considered the for-profit space. Remember that the benefit and 
flexible purpose corporations are not required to pursue charitable purposes, much less make 
such purposes primary; nor are they even required to supplant shareholder primacy. Instead, 
they may choose to consider the effect of decisions on selected alternative constituencies or 
stakeholders when making decisions about the business and its operations. It is reasonable to 
presume from these standards that entities operating under the applicable forms will be 
competing with traditional for-profit enterprises.  
Also, there is no evidence that choosing to consider other constituencies when 
making decisions so weakens an enterprise that excusing it from the market or any of its 
component parts is justified because of form. Among the charitable hybrid forms, only the 
L3C has a reasonable chance of demonstrating such a diminished capacity because of the 
mandatory primacy of charitable purpose; after all, we have a charitable sector in part 
because of the absence of market solutions to serve their underlying opportunities or meet 
their problems. But, L3Cs are not exempt charities so even they should not be excluded from 
the marketplace. 
One of the most commonly mentioned ways of excusing charitable hybrid forms from 
the market is by affording them tax-favored treatment because of their structure alone. There 
is no reason to believe that these forms should not compete on the same terms as profit-
oriented, tax paying entities or that tax incentives are necessary or desirable to induce 
investment. Additionally, there is no reason to exclude such income from the tax base such as 
16 
 
there is with the earnings of and contributions to exempt charities. 
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This is not to suggest that charitable hybrid forms should not benefit from tax 
incentives or other treatment. Instead, it is to advocate that they should not benefit because of 
their statutory form. Other normal tax treatment should be available, whether charitable 
deductions for contributions they make, research and development credits, business losses, 
etc., but those are available because of activities expressly undertaken rather than because of 
form. This approach is consistent with how tax favored treatment is otherwise bestowed. The 
reasons for deviating from that approach must be better explained and achieve a level of 
compulsion that seems out of reach. 
 Another basis for retaining charitable hybrid forms within the market is that doing so 
is consistent with applying market-oriented causes of action, remedies, and standing rather 
than those of charitable trust and charity law. If a rationale for not imposing the strictures of 
charitable trusts and charities is to permit distribution of profits, realization of value, and 
otherwise private decision-making of the market, then it seems only natural that the rationale 
implicitly incorporates the boundaries and limitations of that market as well.  
Of course, the flip side of the market participation coin is that charitable hybrid forms 
should not also be subjected to the barriers of charitable trust and charity law that will 
interfere with application of these forms. Even more onerous, those barriers will prevent their 
successful implementation. That is not a result that legislators could have intended by 
enacting the legislation that gave rise to these forms. That result also counters the inherent 
good and desirability of success in achieving charitable outcomes and addressing problems 
that underlie the need for charitable intervention in the first place. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The formal emergence of statutory hybrid forms has resulted in degrees of interest 
that have ranged from unbridled enthusiasm to predictions of cataclysm. Through it all, the 
forms are being used. Twenty states have adopted the benefit corporation, two the 
flexible/social purpose corporation, and eight the L3C. Regulators are faced with the very 
real prospect of determining how best to oversee regulation of over 1800 of these enterprises. 
Meanwhile, many entrepreneurs, investors, creditors, professional advisors, and others do not 
seem to be waiting for those determinations.  Untold others, however, are and will continue 
to remain sidelined until there is greater certainty and clarity about these forms and how they 
will be regulated.  
Their hesitation is understandable. After all, if decisions are made to regulate 
applications of these forms that include charitable pursuits under the rubric of charitable trust 
or charities laws, the implications could be profound for the ability to distribute profits, to 
use equity as part of a compensation system, to modify purposes, to merge or transfer assets, 
and otherwise. The fact that the Illinois legislature chose to specifically subject the State’s 
L3Cs to the charitable trust regime suggests that such an approach is taken seriously as an 
option despite its problems.  
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Among the problems are that these charitable hybrids do not meet the criteria for 
applying the blanket of trust or charities law as a matter of the forms themselves. The 
consequences for doing so render these forms inoperable, which then present a 
complementary separation of powers problem that pits legislative intent against executive 
enforcement as the latter essentially prevents the former’s intent from gaining traction. 
Absent evidence that alternative approaches cannot adequately protect the public interest, 
such an extreme result should be avoided. Fortunately, there are alternative approaches to 
regulating the enterprises that adopt these new forms, including causes of action and 
remedies grounded in fiduciary duty, securities fraud, consumer protection, equitable 
disgorgement, and lost limited liability.  
These forms are not appropriate for every situation and probably should not be used 
in most circumstances. But there are situations in which their adoption can meaningfully 
align decision-making responsibility, standards, capital, and other resources to address 
problems or pursue opportunities that traditional forms may not be as well suited for solving 
or pursuing. Particularly if focused on that subset of private benefit and social good that 
society has determined to be legitimate charitable pursuits, it seems as if we should welcome 
innovative approaches and allocations to solving those problems or pursuing those 
opportunities, while simultaneously protecting against abuse. Applying a charitable trust or 
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